1988 – Telefast v. Castro, GR. No. 73867 (Negligence, Failure to Send Telegram, Telegram Company Obligations)

3.1. DATE OF PROMULGATION

• February 29, 1988

3.2. DECIDING COURT

• Supreme Court of the Philippines

3.3. DIVISION

• Second Division

3.4. PONENTE

• Padilla, J.

3.5. CONCURRENCE AND ATTENDANCE

3.6. SEPARATE OPINIONS

3.7.PARTIES

3.8. COUNSEL

3.9. NATURE OF ACTION

• Petition for Review on Certionari

3.10. LAWS AND PROVISIONS CITED

• Civil Code, Article 1170
• Civil Code, Article 2176
• Civil Code, Article 2217

3.11. CASES CITED

• None

4.1. FACTS

• 1956, November 2
  • Consolacion Bravo-Castro, wife of plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. and mother of the other plaintiffs, passed away in Lingayen, Pangasinan
  • On the same day, her daughter Sofia C. Crouch, who was then vacationing in the Philippines, addressed a telegram to plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. at 685 Wanda, Scottsburg, Indiana, U.S.A., 47170 announcing Consolacion’s death.
  • The telegram was accepted by the defendant in its Dagupan office, for transmission, after payment of the required fees or charges.
  • The telegram never reached its addressee. Consolacion was interred with only her daughter Sofia in attendance. Neither the husband nor any of the other children of the deceased, then all residing in the United States, returned for the burial.
• When Sofia returned to the United States, she discovered that the wire she had caused the defendant to send, had not been received.

4.2. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

• CFI Pangasinan
  • Plaintiffs filed for action for damages arising from defendant’s breach of contract.
  • The only defense of the defendant was that it was unable to transmit the telegram because of “technical and atmospheric factors beyond its control.”
  • No evidence appears on record that defendant ever made any attempt to advise the plaintiff Sofia C. Crouch as to why it could not transmit the telegram
  • The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, after trial, ordered the defendant (now petitioner) to pay the plaintiffs (now private respondents) damages
• Intermediate Appellate Court
  • Affirmed CFI’s decision but eliminated compensatory damages and exemplary damages to private respondents, while reducing moral damages.
• Supreme Court
  • Petition appeals from IAC, contending that the award of moral damages should be eliminated as defendant’s negligent act was not motivated by “fraud, malice or recklessness.”
  • In other words, under petitioner’s theory, it can only be held liable for P31.92, the fee or charges paid by Sofia C. Crouch for the telegram that was never sent to the addressee thereof.

4.3. ISSUES

• Whether the petitioner company is liable for damages?
• Whether the petitioner company is liable for moral damages?
• Whether the petitioner company is liable for compensatory damages?
• Whether the petitioner company is liable for exemplary damages?

4.4. HELD

• Whether the petitioner company is liable for damages?
  • Yes
    • Art. 1170 of the Civil Code provides that “those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”
    • Art. 2176 also provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.”
    • In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent Sofia C. Crouch entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private respondent’s message overseas by telegram. This, petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of contravening its obligation to said private respondent and is thus liable for damages.
    • This liability is not limited to actual or quantified damages. To sustain petitioner’s contrary position in this regard would result in an inequitous situation where petitioner will only be held liable for the actual cost of a telegram fixed thirty (30) years ago
• Whether the petitioner company is liable for moral damages?
  • Yes
    • We find Art. 2217 of the Civil Code applicable to the case at bar. It states: “Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.”
• Whether the petitioner company is liable for compensatory damages?
  • Yes
    • We also sustain the trial court’s award of P16,000.00 as compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch representing the expenses she incurred when she came to the Philippines from the United States to testify before the trial court.
    • Had petitioner not been remiss in performing its obligation, there would have been no need for this suit or for Mrs. Crouch’s testimony.
• Whether the petitioner company is liable for exemplary damages?
  • Yes
    • The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified and, therefore, sustained in the amount of P1,000.00 for each of the private respondents, as a warning to all telegram companies to observe due diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers.

4.5. DISPOSITION

Petition denied, decision appealed from modified in terms of damages awarded.

4.6. SEPARATE OPINION

• Melencio-Herrera, concurring
  • I concur. In addition to compensatory and exemplary damages, moral damages are recoverable in actions for breach of contract, as in this case, where the breach has been wanton and reckless, tantamount to bad faith.