1984 – Ronquillo v. CA, GR No. L-55138 (Compromise Agreement, Collection of Sum, individually and jointly)

3.1. DATE OF PROMULGATION

• September 28, 1984

3.2. DECIDING COURT

• Supreme Court of the Philippines

3.3. DIVISION

• Second Division

3.4. PONENTE

• Cuevas, J.

3.5. CONCURRENCE AND ATTENDANCE

3.5.3. ABSENT/OTHERS

• Aquino
  • concurs in result only
• Concepcion Jr.
  • on leave
• Guerrero
  • on leave

3.6. SEPARATE OPINIONS

3.7.PARTIES

3.8. COUNSEL

3.8.1. PETITIONER

• Gloria A. Fortun

3.8.2 RESPONDENTS

• Roselino Reyes Isler

3.9. NATURE OF ACTION

• Petition to review issued resolution of the then Court of Appeals

3.10. LAWS AND PROVISIONS CITED

• Civil Code, Article 1207
• Civil Code, Article 1208

3.11. CASES CITED

• Vda. de Sayman vs. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 650
• Fortich-Celdran, et al, vs. Celdran, et al, 19 SCRA 502
• Iligan Electric Light Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 10 SCRA 46
• Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768
• Locsin vs. Limaco, 26 SCRA 816
• Suco vs. Vda. de Leary, 12 SCRA 326
• Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307
• Parot v. Gemora, 7 Phil. 94, 97.
• Un Pak Leung vs. Negorra, 9 Phil. 381

4.1. FACTS

• …

4.2. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

• Court of First Instance, Rizal
  • 1979, July 23
    • Petitioner was originally involved as one of four defendants in a case for the collection of sum for the total amount of P117,498.98, which was dishonored by the drawee bank.
  • 1979, December 13
    • The lower court decided based on the compromise agreement between the parties, of which among the stipulations are as follows:
      • “1. Plaintiff agrees to reduce its total claim of P117,498.95 to only P110,000.00 and defendants agree to acknowledge the validity of such claim and further bind themselves to initially pay out of the total indebtedness of P110,000.00 the amount of P55,000.00 on or before December 24, 1979, the balance of P55,000.00, defendants individually and jointly agree to pay within a period of six months from January 1980, or before June 30, 1980;
      • “4. That both parties agree that failure on the part of either party to comply with the foregoing terms and conditions, the innocent party will be entitled to an execution of the decision based on this compromise agreement and the defaulting party agrees and hold themselves to reimburse the innocent party for attorney’s fees, execution fees and other fees related with the execution.”
  • 1979, December 26
    • Private respondent filed a Motion of Execution on the ground that defendants failed to make the initial payment of P55,000.00 on or before December 24, 1979.
    • Petitioner opposed the motion contending that his inability to make the payment was due to private respondent’s own act of making himself scarce and inaccessible on December 24, 1979.
    • Petitioner then prayed that private respondent be ordered to accept his payment in the amount of P13,750.00.
  • 1980, January 16
    • Upon the hearing of the Motion for execution, petitioner tendered the P13,750.00 as initial payment. Another defendant offered said amount as initial payment as well.
    • Private respondent refused to accept these as payment, demanding the full initial installment.
    • Petitioner and his co-defendant deposited this value to the Clerk of Court, which was subsequently withdrawn by private respondent.
    • The court issued a writ of execution against the two other defendants who did not pay the value.
  • 1980, January 22
    • Private respondent moved for the reconsideration and/or modification of the aforesaid Order of execution and prayed instead for the “execution of the decision in its entirety against all defendants, jointly and severally.”
    • Petitioner opposed the said motion arguing that under the decision of the lower court being executed which has already become final, the liability of the four (4) defendants was not expressly declared to be solidary, consequently each defendant is obliged to pay only his own pro-rata or 1/4 of the amount due and payable.
  • 1980, March 17
    • The court granted the writ of execution.
    • Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
    • Hearing for reconsideration was set on March 25.
  • 1980, March 19
    • A writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the sum of P82,500.00 as against the properties of the defendants (including petition), “singly or jointly liable.”
  • 1980, March 20
    • The special sherif issued a notice of sheriff’s sale for the sale of certain furnitures and appliances found in the petitioner’s residence to satisfy the sum of P82,500.00
    • This was set on April 2.
  • 1980, April 2
    • The motion for reconsideration was denied, but because of the motion for reconsideration filed at the Court of Appeals, the public sale did not proceed.
• Court of Appeals
  • 1980, March 26
    • Petitioner filed on March 26, 1980 a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the then Court of Appeals praying at the same time for the issuance of a restraining order to stop the public sale. He raised the question of the validity of the order of execution, the writ of execution and the notice of public sale of his properties to satisfy fully the entire unpaid obligation payable by all of the four (4) defendants, when the lower court’s decision based on the compromise agreement did not specifically state the liability of the four (4) defendants to be solidary.
      • Realizing the actual threat to his property rights poised by the re-setting of the hearing of his motion for reconsideration for April 2, 1980 at 8:30 a.m. such that if his motion for reconsideration would be denied he would have no more time to obtain a writ from the appellate court to stop the scheduled public sale of his personal properties at 10:00 a.m. of the same day.
  • 1980, June 30
    • CA denied the petition, believing it to be premature.
    • Petitioner moved to reconsider, claiming that on April 2, the lower court had already denied the motion referred to, and thus the legal issues were ripe for determination.
  • 1980, August 20
    • CA denied the motion for reconsideration.
• Supreme Court
  • Petitioner files a petition for review, assigning the following errors in the CA resolution
    • (a) declaring as premature, and in denying due course to the petition to restrain implementation of a writ of execution issued at variance with the final decision of the lower court filed barely four (4) days before the scheduled public sale of the attached movable properties;
    • (b) denying reconsideration of the Resolution of June 30, 1980, which declared as premature the filing of the petition, although there is proof on record that as of April 2, 1980, the motion referred to was already denied by the lower court and there was no more
    • (c) failing to resolve the legal issues raised in the petition and in not declaring the liabilities of the defendants, under the final decision of the lower court, to be only joint;
    • (d) not holding the lower court’s order of execution dated March 17, 1980, the writ of execution and the notice of sheriff’s sale, executing the lower court’s decision against “all defendants, singly and jointly”, to be at variance with the lower court’s final decision which did not provide for solidary obligation; and
    • (e) not declaring as invalid and unlawful the threatened execution, as against the properties of petitioner who had paid his pro-rata share of the adjudged obligation, of the total unpaid amount payable by his joint co-defendants.

4.3. ISSUES

• Whether the filing of a petition for certiorari before CA against an Order of Execution issued by a lower Court while a motion of reconsideration is pending proper?
• Whether an obligation described as “individually and jointly” is enforceable against one of the obligors?

4.4. HELD

• Whether the filing of a petition for certiorari before CA against an Order of Execution issued by a lower Court while a motion of reconsideration is pending proper?
  • Yes
    • Anent the first issue raised, suffice it to state that while as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration should precede recourse to certiorari in order to give the trial court an opportunity to correct the error that it may have committed, the said rule is not absolute and may be dispensed with in instances where the filing of a motion for reconsideration would serve no useful purpose, such as when the motion for reconsideration would raise the same point stated in the motion or where the error is patent for the order is void or where the relief is extremely urgent, as in cases where execution had already been ordered where the issue raised is one purely of law.
    • In the case at bar, the records show that not only was a writ of execution issued but petitioner’s properties were already scheduled to be sold at public auction on April 2, 1980 at 10:00 a.m. The records likewise show that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the questioned Order of Execution was filed on March 17, 1980 and was set for hearing on March 25, 1980 at 8:30 a.m., but upon motion of private respondent, the hearing was reset to April 2, 1980 at 8:30 a.m., the very same day when petitioner’s properties were to be sold at public auction. Needless to state that under the circumstances, petitioner was faced with imminent danger of his properties being immediately sold the moment his motion for reconsideration is denied.
    • Plainly, urgency prompted recourse to the Court of Appeals and the adequate and speedy remedy for petitioner under the situation was to file a petition for certiorari with prayer for restraining order to stop the sale. For him to wait until after the hearing of the motion for reconsideration on April 2, 1980 before taking recourse to the appellate court may already be too late since without a restraining order, the public sale can proceed at 10:00 that morning. In fact, the said motion was already denied by the lower court in its order dated April 2, 1980 and were it not for the pendency of the petition with the Court of Appeals and the restraining order issued thereafter, the public sale scheduled that very same morning could have proceeded.
• Whether an obligation described as “individually and jointly” is enforceable against one of the obligors?
  • Yes
    • In this regard, Article 1207 and 1208 of the Civil Code provides —
      • “Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the prestation. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
      • Art. 1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording of the obligation to which the preceding article refers the contrary does not appear, the credit or debt shall be presumed to be divided into as many equal shares as there are creditors and debtors, the credits or debts being considered distinct from one another, subject to the Rules of Court governing the multiplicity of suits.”
    • Clearly then, by the express term of the compromise agreement and the decision based upon it, the defendants obligated themselves to pay their obligation “individually and jointly”
    • The term “individually” has the same meaning as “collectively”, “separately”, “distinctively”, respectively or “severally”. An agreement to be “individually liable” undoubtedly creates a several obligation, and a “several obligation” is one by which one individual binds himself to perform the whole obligation.
    • In the case of Parot vs. Gemora We therein ruled that “the phrase juntos or separadamente used in the promissory note is an express statement making each of the persons who signed it individually liable for the payment of the full amount of the obligation contained therein.” Likewise in Un Pak Leung vs. Negorra We held that “in the absence of a finding of facts that the defendants made themselves individually liable for the debt incurred they are each liable only for one-half of said amount.”
    • The obligation in the case at bar being described as “individually and jointly”, the same is therefore enforceable against one of the numerous obligors.

4.5. DISPOSITION

• Petition dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

4.6. SEPARATE OPINION

• None