1983 – Philippine National Bank v. Independent Planters Association, Inc., GR No. L-28046, (Collection of Sum, Solidary Debt, Debtor dies while case pending)

3.1. DATE OF PROMULGATION

• May 16, 1983

3.2. DECIDING COURT

• Supreme Court of the Philippines

3.3. DIVISION

• Second Division

3.4. PONENTE

• Plana, J.

3.5. CONCURRENCE AND ATTENDANCE

3.5.3. ABSENT/OTHERS

• Melencio-Herrera
  • On Leave
• Relova
  • On Leave

3.6. SEPARATE OPINIONS

3.7.PARTIES

3.8. COUNSEL

3.8.1. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

• Basa, Ilao, del Rosario, & Diaz

3.8.2. DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

• Laurel Law Office, for Antonio Dimayuga
• Tomas Yumol, for Delfin Fajardo

3.9. NATURE OF ACTION

• Appeal from the order of CFI Manila Br. 20

3.10. LAWS AND PROVISIONS CITED

• Rules of Court, Rule 86
• Civil Code, Rule 1216

3.11. CASES CITED

3.11. CASES CITED

• Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama et al., 107 Phil. 891
• PNB vs. Asuncion, 80 SCRA 321

4.1. FACTS

• …

4.2. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

• Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. XX
  • A complaint was filed by plaintiff against several solidary debtors for collection of sum of money
  • Defendant Valencia dies at the pendency of the case
  • CFI Manila dismissed said case under Rule 86 of Rules of Court, ruling that the complaint, being a money claim based on contract, should be prosecuted in the testate or intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant.
• Supreme Court
  • Appellant invokes right of recourse against one, some, or all of its solidary debtors under Article 1216 of the Civil Code.

4.3. ISSUES

• Whether in an action for collection of a sum of money based on contract against all solidary debtors, the death of one defendant deprives the court of jurisdiction to proceed with the case against all surviving defendants?

4.4. HELD

• Whether in an action for collection of a sum of money based on contract against all solidary debtors, the death of one defendant deprives the court of jurisdiction to proceed with the case against all surviving defendants?
  • Yes.
    • It is now settled that the quoted Article 1216 grants the creditor the substantive right to seek satisfaction of his credit from one, some or all of his solidary debtors, as he deems fit or convenient for the protection of his interests; and if, after instituting a collection suit based on contract against some or all of them and, during its pendency, one of the defendants dies, the court retains jurisdiction to continue the proceedings and decide the case in respect of the surviving defendants.
  • Thus in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama et al., 107 Phil. 891 at 897, this Court ruled:
    • “Construing Section 698 of the Code of Civil Procedure from whence the aforequoted provision (Sec. 6, Rule 86) was taken, this Court held that where two persons are bound in solidum for the same debt and one of them dies, the whole indebtedness can be proved against the estate of the latter, the decedent’s liability being absolute and primary; and if the claim is not presented within the time provided by the rules, the same will be barred as against the estate. It is evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 187 (now Rule 86) provides the procedure should the creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said provision making compliance with such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving solidary debtors, should the creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. There is, therefore, nothing improper in the creditor’s filing of an action against the surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed.”
  • In PNB vs. Asuncion, 80 SCRA 321
    • “A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor.
    • “It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the right to `proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.’ The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he win enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed against the surviving debtors and file its claim in the estate of the deceased solidary debtor . . .
    • “As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literary, Article 1216 of the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate of Manuel Barredo only. Obviously, this provision diminishes the Bank’s right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter, substantive.”

4.5. DISPOSITION

• Case set aside with respect to surviving descendants
• Remanded to Regional Trial Court

4.6. SEPARATE OPINION

• None